Earnings quality: evidence from Canadian firms’ choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP by Burnett, Brian M. et al.
  
Brian M. Burnett, Elizabeth A. Gordon, Bjorn N. Jorgensen 
and Cheryl L. Linthicum 
Earnings quality: evidence from Canadian 
firms’ choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Burnett, Brian M., Gordon, Elizabeth A., Jorgensen, Bjorn N. and Linthicum, Cheryl L. (2015) 
Earnings quality: evidence from Canadian firms’ choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. 
Accounting Perspectives, 14 (3). pp. 212-249. ISSN 1911-3838 
DOI: 10.1111/1911-3838.12051  
 
© 2015 CAAA/ACPC 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62325/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
Earnings Quality: Evidence from Canadian firms’ choice between 
IFRS and U.S. GAAP* 
 
Brian M. Burnett** 
Biola University 
 
Elizabeth A. Gordon 
Temple University 
 
Bjorn N. Jorgensen 
London School of Economics 
 
Cheryl L. Linthicum 
University of Texas at San Antonio 
 
June 1, 2015 
 
 
Abstract 
For fiscal years starting on or after January 1, 2011, Canada abandoned Canadian Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and adopted International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), but permitted firms cross-listed in the U.S. to adopt U.S. GAAP instead.  We 
document that the number of Canadian firms reporting under U.S. GAAP increased after Canada 
adopted IFRS.  We find that cross-listed firms are more likely to choose IFRS if IFRS is the 
standard most commonly used by the leading global firms in their industry. In addition, we find 
that firms more likely to choose IFRS are larger, of civil law legal origin, have less U.S. 
operations, report exploration expense, have fewer U.S. shareholders and report higher 
stockholders’ equity under Canadian GAAP than under U.S. GAAP. Of these, we find that the 
convergence benefits of comparability with industry peers is the most significant determinant in 
firms’ choice of standard. Further, we are unable to document changes in earnings quality from 
cross-listed firms adopting IFRS or U.S. GAAP or that earnings quality changed for firms 
adopting IFRS relative to firms adopting U.S. GAAP.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine Canada’s adoption of IFRS focusing on the option that permitted 
cross-listed Canadian companies to adopt U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. 
GAAP) instead.
1
  We explore both the determinants and consequences of cross-listed firms’ 
choice of IFRS versus U.S. GAAP.  We document the consequence that more Canadian 
companies report using U.S. GAAP after the adoption of IFRS than before.  As such, Canada’s 
adoption of IFRS offers a unique setting to examine and provide further evidence on the debate 
about firms having a choice among accounting standards. 
To our knowledge, only two prior natural experimental settings permit empirical-archival 
examination of the effects of IFRS adoption relative to U.S. GAAP: (1) European exchanges that 
allowed some firms the choice between U.S. GAAP and International Accounting Standards 
(IAS), the predecessor to IFRS, and (2) U.S. cross-listed firms that were required to reconcile 
differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.  Ashbaugh (2001) studies non-U.S., non-U.K. firms 
from 17 countries listed in London that voluntarily adopted either IAS or U.S. GAAP. She finds 
that firms are more likely to choose IAS when larger, listed in many capital markets, issuing 
equity, or have large differences in mandatory disclosure standards between home-country 
GAAP, IAS, and U.S. GAAP. Germany’s Neue Markt exchange allows for an examination of 
the choice of accounting standards in a market where domestic GAAP was considered low 
quality since enforcement of standards was limited in Germany at that time.  Germany’s 
enforcement body did not implement a proactive review of financial statements until 2005 
(Christensen et al. 2011), which makes it challenging to infer whether the insignificant 
                                                 
1
 Only firms registered with the SEC were immediately permitted to use U.S. GAAP instead of IFRS by Canadian 
securities regulators. However, we note that Canadian firms arguably had a de facto choice because firms could, 
though at some cost, register with the SEC and report with U.S. GAAP. In fact, Nimin Energy Corporation and 
some other Canadian firms publicly stated that they initiated cross-listing in the U.S. to be permitted to adopt U.S. 
GAAP. 
 2 
differences between IAS and U.S. GAAP documented in Leuz (2003) for Neue Markt and in 
Bartov et al. (2005) for all German exchanges are due to the similarity of the standards or lack of 
enforcement of the standards.   
The IFRS to U.S. GAAP reconciliations of foreign private issuers (FPIs) provide a direct 
comparison of reporting under IFRS and U.S. GAAP.
2
  Gordon et al. (2013) compare the 
earnings attributes of IFRS and U.S. GAAP holding fixed the underlying cash transactions of the 
firm.  They conclude that while some earnings attributes do not differ due to accounting 
standards, other differences due to financial reporting incentives persist even after the adoption 
of IFRS.
3
   
While informative, the generalizability of the above findings to the Canadian setting may 
be limited.  If enforcement and other financial reporting incentives are integral determinant of 
earnings quality then drawing reliable inferences from samples of European firms that face 
different reporting environments is difficult.  Specifically, Christensen et al. (2013) note that 
IFRS adoption in EU coincides with increased enforcement and their findings suggest that 
liquidity increases with stronger enforcement, instead of IFRS adoption per se.  Their findings, 
however, do not preclude that IFRS adoption per se could have an effect on earnings quality in 
countries with a long tradition of strong enforcement, such as Canada (see Barth and Israeli, 
2013).  Further, most European countries have civil law legal origins, except for the two 
common law countries, Ireland and the United Kingdom.  Ball et al. (2000) document that legal 
origin is a co-determinant of earnings attributes.  With Quebec being the notable exception, the 
                                                 
2
 During the period from 2004 through 2007, these foreign private issuers were required to reconcile from IFRS to 
U.S. GAAP. 
3
 Similarly, Eng et al. (2014) study non-U.S. firms with American Depository Receipts (ADRs) that were either 
required or permitted to adopt IFRS instead of U.S. GAAP and overall find insignificant differences in earnings 
attributes. Further, current research studies the effect of discontinuing the reconciliation requirements for foreign 
private issuers. See, among others, Chen and Sami (2008, 2013), Jiang et al. (2010), Kim et al. (2012), and Chen and 
Khurana (2015). 
 3 
remaining Canadian provinces have common law, and as a result inferences regarding IFRS 
adoption from a sample of firms located in the European Union’s predominantly civil law 
countries with lower intensity of enforcement may be limited. 
Finally, with the recent adoption of IFRS, Canadian companies are using updated IFRS 
standards that have benefited from the IASB-FASB convergence project.  In summary, the 
Canadian setting has three distinct characteristics: (1) the choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP, 
(2) a high level of enforcement in Canada both before and after IFRS adoption, and (3) the recent 
adoption of IFRS. 
 We examine two main aspects related to IFRS adoption in Canada.  First, we describe 
and investigate the determinants of the initial reporting choices of Canadian firms.
4
  While 
Canada adopted IFRS for fiscal years starting on or after January 1, 2011, standard setters gave 
companies the de facto option to use IFRS or U.S. GAAP.  Those Canadian firms that had cross-
listed in the U.S. and maintained their FPI status did not need permission from regulators to use 
U.S. GAAP.  Other Canadian firms needed regulatory approval to use U.S. GAAP.  
Interestingly, we find more firms report under U.S. GAAP after Canada adopted IFRS.  Before 
Canada’s IFRS adoption, 48 out of 245 cross-listed companies reported under U.S. GAAP, or 
about 20%.  After, 72 (32%) of the cross-listed firms report under U.S. GAAP.  Of the 197 cross-
listed companies that previously reported under Canadian GAAP, we document that at least 29 
or about 15%, voluntarily choose U.S. GAAP over IFRS, implying that companies differ in the 
                                                 
4
 Canadian firms may continue to reassess whether IFRS or U.S. GAAP best meets their reporting needs. For 
example, Encana initially switched to IFRS from Canadian GAAP, but then announced on December 8, 2011 that 
for fiscal 2012 it was switching to U.S. GAAP, stating “Adopting U.S. GAAP will make it easier for investors to 
compare Encana’s financial performance with its peer companies, most of which are based in the United States. 
Consistent with current practice, Encana will report its 2011 year-end financial results in February 2012 in 
accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Starting in April 2012, Encana will report its 
first quarter results using U.S. GAAP.” 
 4 
perceived costs and benefits of their choice of accounting standards.
5
  We investigate the 
determinants of the choice of IFRS versus U.S. GAAP, and we find that cross-listed firms are 
more likely to choose IFRS if IFRS is the standard most commonly used by the leading global 
firms in their industry. In addition, we find that the firms more likely to choose IFRS are larger, 
of civil law legal origin, have fewer U.S. operations, report exploration expense, have fewer U.S. 
shareholders and report higher stockholders’ equity under Canadian GAAP than under U.S. 
GAAP. Our analysis indicates that the convergence benefits of comparability with industry peers 
is the most significant determinant in firms’ choice of standard.  
 Second, we investigate effects of IFRS adoption on earnings quality measures that are 
predicted to arise from two primary differences between the three accounting standards – 
Canadian GAAP, IFRS, and U.S. GAAP.  The first primary difference is that IFRS provides 
managers with more reporting discretion than either Canadian GAAP or U.S. GAAP (U.S. 
GAAP provides more detailed industry and transaction guidance than Canadian GAAP).  
Managers may use the increase (decrease) in reporting discretion under IFRS (U.S. GAAP) 
relative to Canadian GAAP to better convey economic performance or opportunistically. We 
examine two earnings attributes that examine these competing motivations: earnings persistence 
and accrual aggressiveness. Earnings persistence measures how well current earnings predict 
future earnings.  An increase in earnings persistence is consistent with current earnings better 
conveying future performance.  We use two common measures of accrual aggressiveness, signed 
and unsigned accruals, to see if managers’ increase in discretion results in more opportunistic 
reporting.   
                                                 
5
 In addition to these 29 firms, five Canadian firms were mandated to switch to U.S. GAAP by the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) because they no longer qualified for Foreign Private Issuer status. 
 5 
The second primary difference between the three accounting standards is that the 
verification standard for losses and gains is more symmetric under IFRS than under Canadian 
GAAP and U.S. GAAP.  IFRS requires reversal of impairment losses on tangible and certain 
intangible assets.  Additionally, IFRS permits firms to revalue tangible and some intangible 
assets to fair value.  Canadian GAAP does not permit these reversals and revaluations, except for 
inventory write-downs (which U.S. GAAP does not permit).  As such, we examine timely loss 
recognition as discussed by Basu (1997) and Watts (2003a, b). Timely loss recognition may 
decrease under IFRS because more unrealized gains are recognized in IFRS earnings than under 
Canadian GAAP or U.S. GAAP.  
We employ a pre-post research design that uses each firm as its own control and 
examines the difference-in-differences between firms that choose IFRS to firms that choose U.S. 
GAAP.  To control for potential selection bias, we include the inverse Mills’ ratio from the 
accounting standard choice analysis.  We are unable to document a significant change in 
earnings quality using any of the three attributes for firms adopting IFRS or U.S. GAAP or that 
adopting IFRS affected earnings quality more or less than firms adopting U.S. GAAP.  Inability 
to reject the null hypothesis of no change in accounting quality is challenging to interpret 
because our statistical tests may lack power to detect the true effect on earnings quality, possibly 
due to small sample sizes, our chosen earnings quality measures may be measured with error or 
may not capture the appropriate earnings attributes, or the null hypothesis is true.  We stress this 
caveat – that concluding from our study that earnings quality did not change for Canadian firms 
is inappropriate – because a current academic debate explores whether financial reporting 
incentives play the dominant role on earnings quality relative to adoption of new accounting 
standards per se (see Christensen et al. 2013 and Barth and Israeli 2013).  
 6 
Nevertheless, our findings appear consistent with the successful transition to co-existence 
of two accounting standards in the Canadian markets with a high level of enforcement.  By 
allowing choice, direct adoption costs borne by firms and their owners are invariably lower.  
Given the similarities between the Canadian and U.S. setting, and between IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP, these findings inform the debate over whether the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) should permit U.S. firms to choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP, see Cox 
(2007). 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 summarizes the arguments for and against full 
convergence or permitting two accounting standards to exist side by side in a market.  Section 3 
offers a brief literature review and description of the institutional background.  Section 4 
investigates Canadian firms’ choice of accounting standards.  Section 5 analyzes the earnings 
quality of IFRS adoption in Canada.  Section 6 concludes and suggests avenues for future 
research. An Appendix provides formal variable definitions.  
 
 
2.  Choice among accounting standards 
Academic literature discusses the costs and benefits of full convergence versus continued 
competition between IFRS and U.S. GAAP accounting standards.  One core argument in favor of 
allowing firms a choice between accounting standards is that competition among standard setting 
bodies increases the long run efficiency of accounting standards.  The standard-setting 
organizations are likely to be more responsive to constituents’ demand for better standards than 
with a monopolist standard setter.  Countervailing concerns, however, include that competition 
may lead to a “race to the bottom” and lower comparability.  Although motivated by this debate, 
 7 
we cannot speak directly to long run effects (if any) of absence of convergence but merely to 
firms’ choice of accounting standards and the resulting consequences.  
 Canada’s recent experience with IFRS adoption also provides potential insights about 
what might happen if the U.S. permits U.S. firms to choose between the two standards.  As 
Tricia O’Malley, a former Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) member and IASB 
member, stated, Canada is “the canary in the coal mine on behalf of this whole process [in the 
US]” (SEC 2011b).  Canada permitted choice between accounting standards for Canadian firms 
registered with the SEC.  These firms were allowed to choose between the IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP.  Such choice is consistent with a long-standing tradition for competition between 
provinces in Canada concerning its legal standard setting (Daniels 1991).  In summary, Canada’s 
IFRS adoption experience may provide unique insights about the unsettled debate over whether 
the SEC should permit U.S. firms to choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. 
 
3.  Related research and institutional background 
The large-scale adoption of IFRS has prompted accounting researchers and regulators to consider 
the preferred attributes of accounting standards.
6
  Some argue that adoption per se is more a label 
than an actual change in financial reporting quality.  While the prevailing accounting standards 
(prior GAAP or IFRS) might be of importance, the surrounding institutions and enforcement 
mechanisms that help shape managers’ financial reporting incentives could be equally – or even 
more – important.  Given the flexibility within every accounting standard, the financial reporting 
incentives could a priori play as important a role as the rules and standards themselves.  
                                                 
6
 For recent survey papers see, Hail et al. (2010a, b) and Kothari et al. (2010). Hail et al. (2010a,b) provide a 
conceptual discussion of the economic arguments for and against the adoption of IFRS. 
 8 
The use of IFRS by over 100 countries has led to a number of insightful academic 
studies, mainly focused in the European Union (EU).  This literature generally documents capital 
market benefits around IFRS adoption. For example, Daske et al. (2008) investigate the firm 
characteristics of early IFRS adopters in the EU and find improvements in liquidity, cost of 
capital, and equity valuation, while Armstrong et al. (2010) find share prices react positively to 
the likelihood of IFRS adoption in the European setting.  Barth et al. (2008) find improvements 
in earnings quality for voluntary adopters of IFRS using a broad sample of countries.  Not all 
research, however, documents positive effects of IFRS adoption.  Ahmed et al. (2013) find 
mandatory IFRS adoption decreased earnings quality using a broad sample of countries.  
Christensen et al. (2013) note that IFRS adoption in the EU coincides with increased 
enforcement and their findings suggest that stock market liquidity increased with stronger 
enforcement, instead of IFRS adoption per se. 
Other research considers the effect of IFRS adoption of firms cross-listed in the U.S.  
Henry et al. (2009) and Gordon et al. (2013) consider the effect of FPIs’ adoption of IFRS.  For 
example, Henry et al. (2009) study the reconciliations between IFRS and U.S. GAAP for 75 US-
listed European firms.  They find that the level of reported net income is statistically significantly 
higher under IFRS relative to U.S. GAAP.  Further, the reconciliation from IFRS to U.S. GAAP 
is value relevant.  However, the U.S. SEC removed the reconciliation requirement for IFRS filers 
for reporting periods beginning in 2008.  Therefore, while some non-U.S. firms can report using 
either IFRS or U.S. GAAP, U.S. firms have no choice but to provide the SEC with financial 
statements prepared using U.S. GAAP. 
Prior research indicates that Canadian GAAP is a high quality accounting standard that is 
quite similar to U.S. GAAP (Bandyopadhyay et al. 1994), although using a more current sample, 
 9 
Webster and Thornton (2005) find Canadian GAAP yields higher accrual quality than U.S. 
GAAP. 
 
Canadian IFRS adoption 
The Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) sets accounting standards for 
Canadian entities outside of the public sector.  Prior to 2004, the AcSB was implementing a dual 
strategy of harmonizing with U.S. GAAP and working towards convergence with international 
accounting standards.  The ultimate goal was one single set of internationally accepted standards.  
On May 31, 2004, the AcSB reconsidered its existing strategy and sought input from constituents 
on whether Canada should (1) keep Canadian GAAP, (2) abandon Canadian GAAP and adopt 
IFRS, (3) abandon Canadian GAAP and adopt U.S. GAAP, or (4) permit firms to choose 
between IFRS or U.S. GAAP.   
Constituents advocated for all four positions.  Proponents of maintaining Canadian 
GAAP argued that the costs involved in switching to either IFRS or U.S. GAAP outweighed the 
benefits.  They felt that Canadian GAAP better represented the economics of Canadian firms and 
saw no need to abandon Canadian GAAP in the near term.  Proponents of adopting U.S. GAAP 
argued that this was the natural choice since so many companies already reported under U.S. 
GAAP for primary or secondary reporting purposes.  They further argued that U.S. GAAP was a 
high quality standard and that separate Canadian and U.S. GAAPs led to poor comparability 
within industry peer groups and within a single North American market.  The majority of 
respondents were in favor of adopting IFRS.  They emphasized that capital markets had become 
truly international, a trend they believed would only accelerate in the future, and that it was in 
the best long-term interest of Canada to adopt IFRS.  The AcSB also noted the global focus of 
 10 
IFRS and knew they could be involved in the due process as the standards continued to evolve. 
In contrast, U.S. GAAP was focused only on serving the needs of the U.S. capital markets and 
that neither the SEC nor FASB were going to be responsive to their needs or concerns.  Some 
constituents, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, advocated permitting firms to choose between 
IFRS or U.S. GAAP.  
After considering their constituents’ input, on February 10, 2005, the AcSB proposed 
adopting IFRS in full to its oversight body, the Accounting Standards Oversight Council, while 
allowing entities cross-listed in the U.S. to use U.S. GAAP.
7
  A little less than a year later the 
AcSB ratified its plan on January 10, 2006 to adopt IFRS over a five-year transition period for 
fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2011, while allowing SEC registrants to continue 
reporting with U.S. GAAP.
8
   
 
Canadian GAAP and U.S.-listed companies 
While the AcSB required all publicly accountable enterprises to apply IFRS, the 
provincial securities regulators with authority over the application of accounting standards gave 
Canadian companies cross-listed in the U.S. the option to choose IFRS or U.S. GAAP.  The 
provincial securities regulators also permitted firms to petition for special permission to use U.S. 
GAAP without listing in the United States.  The provincial securities regulators required 
companies to begin reporting under IFRS or U.S. GAAP for the first quarter of 2011 (e.g., 
Ontario Securities Commission 2011).   
                                                 
7
 For a more thorough discussion of why Canada adopted IFRS, please see the AcSB’s 2011 report, “Adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards: Background and Basis for Conclusions.”  See also Leuz and Wysocki. 
(2006). 
8
 Similar to cross-listed companies, private enterprises in Canada were required to choose between accounting 
standards. In 2009, the AcSB published a new set of accounting standards that were a more simplified version of 
Canadian GAAP tailored to the needs of smaller companies. For fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2011, 
private enterprises in Canada were required to adopt this new version of Canadian GAAP or IFRS.  
 11 
 Prior to Canada’s adoption of IFRS, Canadian and U.S. regulators determined that 
Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP were allowable alternatives for cross-listed companies under 
the Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS).
9
  Canadian regulators accepted U.S. GAAP 
for domestic reporting.  U.S. regulators accepted Canadian GAAP for FPIs, without 
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.  Canada was the first country for which the SEC accepted domestic 
GAAP reporting for FPIs.  In November 2007, the U.S. SEC exempted all non-U.S.-based firms 
that report under IFRS from reconciliation.  Therefore, as Canadian firms switched to IFRS, they 
maintained the exemption from reconciliation requirements. 
The distinction between the SEC’s requirements for FPIs and registrants is important in 
our sample selection and research design.
10
  FPIs are not required to report under U.S. GAAP. 
Some Canadian firms listed in the U.S. do not qualify to be FPIs, and must then follow the same 
higher reporting requirements as U.S. companies, including using U.S. GAAP, see Burnett et al. 
(2015).  We exclude these firms from our analysis because they did not have a choice between 
standards. 
 
4.  Firms’ accounting standard choice 
Data 
Our sample consists of Canadian firms in Compustat that were listed in the U.S. and required to 
choose IFRS or U.S. GAAP.  The AcSB required Canadian companies with fiscal years 
beginning on or after January 1, 2011 to adopt IFRS and begin reporting under IFRS in the first 
                                                 
9
 Canadian regulators also permitted these Canadian firms to report under U.S. GAAP.  
10
 The U.S. SEC defines a FPI as any foreign issuer that does not meet either of the following two conditions: (i) 
More than 50 percent of the outstanding voting securities of such issuers are directly or indirectly owned of record 
by residents of the U.S.; and (ii) any of the following: (A) The majority of the executive officers or directors are 
U.S. citizens or residents; (B) More than 50 percent of the assets of the issuer are located in the U.S.; or (C) The 
business of the issuer is administered principally in the U.S. 
 12 
quarter of 2011.
11
  Because of the MJDS, the provincial securities regulators allowed SEC 
registrants to choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP, and similarly required them to begin 
reporting using one of these two accounting standards for the first quarter of 2011 (e.g., Ontario 
Securities Commission 2011).  Beginning in 2006, after the AcSB’s formal adoption of IFRS, we 
classify cross-listed firms’ choices as IFRS and U.S. GAAP by hand-collecting data on their 
accounting standard choice.  Cross-listed firms were required to seek special permission to adopt 
IFRS early, but were allowed to adopt U.S. GAAP at any time. Our sample contains eight firms 
that adopt U.S. GAAP prior to 2011 and five firms that adopt IFRS prior to 2011.
12
  The 
remainder of firms in our sample adopted IFRS or U.S. GAAP for fiscal years beginning on or 
after January 1, 2011, which results in a range of adoption years from 2007 to 2012.
13
  We obtain 
stock prices and most financial data from Compustat, except that we hand-collect firms’ foreign 
sales and assets from their filings on SEDAR and obtain U.S. institutional ownership data from 
13F filings from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings database.  We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.
14
  
Table 1 details our sample selection.  We identified 245 Canadian firms in Compustat 
that were listed in the U.S. at least one year prior to their accounting standard choice.  Panel A 
presents the accounting standards firms adopt conditional on their previous accounting standard.  
The first row indicates that 48 firms were listed in the U.S. and reporting with U.S. GAAP prior 
                                                 
11
 Due to delayed International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)’s projects involving investment companies, 
insurance contracts, and accounting for rate-regulated entities, the provincial securities regulators initially allowed 
investment companies, insurance companies, and rate-regulated entities to delay adoption of IFRS until fiscal years 
beginning on or after January 1, 2013 (2012 for rate-regulated entities).  
12
 The specific year of adoption for early U.S. GAAP adopters are: 2 in 2007, 1 in 2008, 2 in 2009, and 3 in 2010. 
The specific year of adoption for early IFRS adopters are: 3 in 2009 and 2 in 2010.  Our results are qualitatively 
similar if we exclude these firms. 
13
 2012 is the fiscal year of the adoption for firms with fiscal years beginning on or after June 1, 2011.  
14
 In our choice analysis, winsorization at the extreme percentiles may not adequately address outliers with only 170 
observations.  As a sensitivity test, we follow Barth et al. (2008) and winsorized all continuous variables at the 5 
percent level and find qualitatively similar results.  
 13 
to 2006, the year the AcSB formally adopted IFRS.
15
  Many of these firms had already lost their 
FPI status and were required by the SEC to report using U.S. GAAP, which is the primary reason 
why all but three firms continue to use U.S. GAAP.  The second row represents firms listed in 
the U.S., but initially reporting under Canadian GAAP.  These firms are arguably the most 
interesting because they were permitted to choose between IFRS or U.S. GAAP.  Of the 197 
firms in this category, five firms lost their FPI status and were required by the SEC to begin 
reporting with U.S. GAAP.  The remaining 192 firms had a choice between IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP – 29 (15%) chose U.S. GAAP, while 163 (85%) chose IFRS.  
While the majority of Canadian firms chose IFRS, Table 1 documents an interesting 
consequence of Canada’s adoption of IFRS.  Before Canada adopted IFRS, 48 (20%) out of 245 
cross-listed companies previously reported under U.S. GAAP.  After Canada adopted IFRS, the 
number of cross-listed firms reporting under U.S. GAAP increased to 79 (32%). 
Panel B identifies the firms used in our analysis of firms’ accounting standard choice.  
We eliminate: 10 firms that did not provide a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP as this is required 
data to calculate a variable in our analysis; nine firms that did not disclose foreign assets (or 
revenues), which is also used to calculate a variable used in our analysis; five firms that were 
required by the SEC to choose U.S. GAAP because they lost their FPI status and therefore did 
not have a choice of standard; and three rate-regulated entities that chose U.S. GAAP, as 
discussed in footnote 11 above.  Our final sample consists of 170 firms in the choice analysis.   
Of the 170 firms used in the choice analysis, we identify the firms with available data to 
calculate our earnings quality measures as shown in Panel C of Table 1. Our earnings quality 
analysis requires at least two years of data after IFRS adoption, which 29 firms did not have in 
Compustat. 
                                                 
15
 If a firm’s inception is in 2006 or later, we label the firm based on its accounting standard used in its first year. 
 14 
Determinants of firms’ accounting standard choice 
 We examine the determinants of U.S.-listed Canadian firms’ choice between IFRS and 
U.S. GAAP.  We focus on U.S.-listed Canadian firms because they were given a choice between 
IFRS and U.S. GAAP, without having to incur additional costs to obtain special permission to 
use U.S. GAAP or register with the SEC.  We exclude those Canadian firms that originally 
reported under U.S. GAAP because the SEC required many of these to report under U.S. GAAP 
as they did not qualify as FPIs.  This results in a sample of U.S.-listed firms that originally 
reported under Canadian GAAP and then had a choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. 
 We are not the first to examine firms’ choices between accounting standards.  Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) study the determinants of German firms’ choices between German GAAP and 
international reporting standards (U.S. GAAP and IAS).  They find the choice of an international 
reporting standard is positively associated with firms’ performance, measured as return on assets 
(ROA), and financing needs, measured as capital intensity and a listing in the U.S. or UK.  Leuz 
(2003) studies firms trading in Germany’s New Market during the years 1999 and 2000 where 
German firms chose between U.S. GAAP and IAS, the predecessor to IFRS.  His primary 
motivation was to provide evidence about the quality of IAS relative to U.S. GAAP.  Assuming 
U.S. GAAP is associated with higher quality corporate disclosure, he hypothesizes that the 
choice of U.S. GAAP is a function of firm size (+), financing needs (+), and firm performance 
(+/-).  He finds that the choice of U.S. GAAP is significantly and positively associated with 
financing needs, which he notes, is consistent with a perception at that time that U.S. GAAP was 
preferable for firms with large future financing needs because it allowed them better access to 
the U.S. capital markets.  Leuz (2003) does not find that the choice of U.S. GAAP is 
significantly associated with firm size or firm performance. 
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We believe (re)examining the choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP is important.  The 
SEC is contemplating whether to require U.S. public companies to (a) retain U.S. GAAP, (b) 
adopt IFRS, or (c) permit firms to choose between the two standards (see Schnurr 2014).  As the 
most similar capital market to the U.S., Canada is the nearest setting, both geographically and in 
terms of accounting standards and financial reporting incentives, to best possibly understand 
what U.S. firms might choose if permitted a choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.  Finally, the 
study of Canadian firms listed in the U.S. enables more robust analysis than a study of 
accounting choice by non-U.S. listed companies.  The financial reporting incentives of firms are 
similar to U.S. firms; they are all listed in the U.S. and provided reconciliations from Canadian 
GAAP to U.S. GAAP in their SEC filings prior to adopting either IFRS or U.S. GAAP. 
We model the choice between adopting IFRS or U.S. GAAP as a function of the firm-
specific costs and benefits of adoption.  Specifically, we use the following probit regression to 
examine this choice: 
Prob(IFRSt=1) = F(β0 + β1 CAN-US GAAP Distancet-1 + β2 R&Dt-2  + β3 Explorationt-2   
 + β4 IFRS Predominantt-2 + β5 IFRS vs. US Operationst-2  
 + β6 US Ownershipt-2 + β7 Leveraget-2 + β8 Sizet-2  
 + β9 ROAt-2 + β10 Codet-2  + εt)     (1) 
We include industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors.  We calculate the variables in 
our model two years prior to firms’ adoption of IFRS or U.S. GAAP because the decision to 
adopt IFRS requires a two-year transition period, and this is likely when most firms made the 
choice between the two standards. 
As cross-listed firms weighed the costs and benefits of choosing between the accounting 
standards, they commonly disclosed three primary determinants informing their decisions: (1) 
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the impact on reported results, (2) comparability with industry peers, and (3) the needs of key 
stakeholder groups (e.g., shareholders, lenders, etc.).
16
  CAN-US GAAP Distance, R&D, and 
Exploration proxy for the impact on reported results.  IFRS Predominant and IFRS vs. US 
Operations focus on comparability with peer firms. US Ownership considers stakeholders’ 
needs.  Additionally, we include proxies for the relative costs of IFRS adoption versus US 
GAAP and control for firm size, performance, and legal origin. 
The financial statement impact of U.S. GAAP relative to IFRS on reported results is 
likely a primary determinant of firms’ choice between the two standards.  Specifically, firms are 
more likely to choose IFRS than U.S. GAAP when IFRS portrays the firm’s performance and 
financial position in a more favorable light than U.S. GAAP, and vice versa.  Ideally, we could 
observe IFRS and U.S. GAAP reported numbers for the same firm in the same year prior to their 
choice of accounting standard.  Unfortunately, we are unable to observe IFRS and U.S. GAAP 
reported numbers for firms that choose U.S. GAAP.
17
  We are, however, able to observe 
Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP reporting in the year prior to their choice of accounting 
standard because the firms in our sample provided reconciliations to U.S. GAAP.  The difference 
between stockholders’ equity under Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP is similar in nature to a 
LIFO reserve, where adopting U.S. GAAP results in the cumulative difference between the 
standards being reflected in the financial statements. We posit that when stockholders’ equity 
(i.e., net assets) is higher under U.S. GAAP than Canadian GAAP firms are more likely to 
choose U.S. GAAP.  In the spirit of the C-score promoted by Penman and Zhang (2002), we 
                                                 
16
 As an example, Magna International Inc. stated that in making its decision between the two standards, the board 
of directors “considered many factors, including, but not limited to (i) the changes in accounting policies that would 
be required and the resulting impact on our reported results and key performance indicators, (ii) the reporting 
standards expected to be used by many of our industry comparables, and (iii) the financial reporting needs of our 
market participants, including shareholders, lenders, rating agencies and market analysts.” 
17
 For firms that chose IFRS, IFRS adoption requires retroactive disclosure of the prior year under IFRS making it 
possible to observe firms’ reporting under Canadian GAAP and IFRS. Thus, in the year prior to IFRS adoption, for 
firms that adopt IFRS, we can observe their reporting under Canadian GAAP, IFRS, and US GAAP. 
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examine the comparability of stockholders’ equity under Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP as a 
cumulative summary measure of which standard portrays the net assets of a firm in a more 
positive light.
18
  We calculate the variable CAN-US GAAP Distance as Canadian GAAP 
stockholders’ equity less U.S. GAAP stockholders’ equity scaled by the absolute value of 
Canadian GAAP stockholders’ equity (formal definitions for all variables are provided in the 
Appendix that detail the calculations and data sources).
19
  We expect that CAN-US GAAP 
Distance will be positively associated with choosing IFRS. 
We further consider the impact of the standard choice on reported results by focusing on 
a key accounting difference between IFRS and U.S. GAAP with respect to capitalization of 
expenses.  Under U.S. GAAP, R&D expenditures are generally expensed as incurred, with 
capitalization of software development being a notable exception.  In contrast, IFRS requires 
capitalization of certain R&D expenses.  As a consequence, we predict that firms with R&D 
expense are more likely to adopt IFRS. R&D equals one if the firm has R&D expense, and zero 
otherwise. Further, in the mineral resource industries, IFRS permits, but does not require, 
capitalization of exploration and evaluation costs earlier than U.S. GAAP (Gordon et al. 2015).
20
 
Similar to our prediction for R&D, we expect that firms with exploration expense are more likely 
to adopt IFRS. Exploration equals one if the firm has exploration expense, and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
18
 Alternatively, we measure the difference between the net income reported under Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP 
and find qualitatively similar results.  
19
 Ten firms in this sample have negative stockholders’ equity. We obtain qualitatively similar results if we exclude 
these firms from our analysis. 
20
 IFRS also permits earlier capitalization of exploration expenses than Canadian GAAP. For example, Kinross Gold 
Inc. disclosed, “On transition to IFRS, in the opening balance sheet, the change in accounting policy [with respect to 
capitalization of exploration and development expenses] resulted in an increase of $74.4 million in property, plant 
and equipment and $9.6 million in deferred tax liabilities and a decrease of $63.1 million in the accumulated 
deficit…Of the amount capitalized to property, plant and equipment, $25.8 million related to capitalized E&E costs 
and the balance related to capitalized development costs.” 
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Firms are more likely to choose IFRS or U.S. GAAP when that standard provides for 
enhanced comparability with a firms’ peer group.21 We include two variables to proxy for 
comparability with industry peers.  Joos and Leung (2013) argue that the convergence benefits of 
adopting IFRS are highest for firms in industries where IFRS is the predominant accounting 
standard among the leading firms in the world.  Following Joos and Leung (2013), we identify 
the 20 largest non-Canadian firms by market value in Global Compustat for each two-digit SIC 
code in the fiscal year 2009.  Next, for the 20 largest firms globally within each industry, we 
identify the statistical mode of the accounting standards and set IFRS Predominant equal to one 
if IFRS is the most commonly used standard among these 20 firms, and zero otherwise.  As an 
example, if eight of the top 20 firms use IFRS, seven use U.S. GAAP, and five use their 
domestic GAAP (e.g., Brazil, Russia, etc.), then IFRS Predominant is set equal to one for that 
two-digit SIC code. 
We base our second measure of comparability on the foreign markets in which Canadian 
firms participate. Canadian firms with significant operations in the U.S. (outside the U.S.) are 
likely to have peer firms that use U.S. GAAP (IFRS).  We use IFRS vs. US Operations to 
measure whether more of a firm’s foreign operations are in or outside the U.S. IFRS vs. US 
Operations is calculated as the proportion of a firm’s assets located outside of Canada and the 
U.S. less the proportion of a firm’s assets located in the U.S.22  We expect both IFRS 
Predominant and IFRS vs. US Operations will be positively associated with choosing IFRS, 
consistent with a higher likelihood of a firm’s peers using IFRS. 
                                                 
21
 For example, Canadian Pacific Railway Limited stated, “CP commenced reporting its financial results using U.S. 
GAAP, which is consistent with the current reporting of all other North American Class I railways.” 
22
 Alternatively, if we measure firms’ operations using foreign and U.S. revenues, we obtain qualitatively similar 
results. 
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We consider the role of stakeholders’ needs in the choice between the two standards by 
focusing on shareholders.  Chi (2009) finds that processing costs are higher when investors must 
interpret financial statements reported under multiple accounting standards.  Ceteris paribus, 
U.S. shareholders are likely to demand reporting under U.S. GAAP to minimize processing costs 
of financial information for the companies they own.  We proxy for this using US Ownership, 
which is the percentage of common shares held by U.S. institutional investors.  We expect that 
US Ownership will be negatively related to choosing IFRS.  
Since changing accounting standards adopting likely entails renegotiation of contracts, 
where the contractual terms are based on accounting numbers (unless the covenants are based on 
adjusted GAAP), we consider the firm-specific costs involved with renegotiating debt covenants. 
For Canadian firms, renegotiation costs are likely lower when adopting U.S. GAAP than IFRS 
because each of these firms was already providing reconciliation from Canadian GAAP to U.S. 
GAAP in their U.S. filings.
23
  Leverage, long-term debt divided by total assets, captures the costs 
involved in renegotiating debt covenants.  IFRS adoption may move firms closer or farther from 
their debt covenants depending on the effect of IFRS adoption.  For example, IFRS adoption 
permits firms to revalue their property, plant and equipment (PP&E) to fair market value.  If 
revaluation results in higher PP&E values then IFRS adoption may reduce a firm’s leverage ratio 
and therefore reduce debt-covenant renegotiation costs.  Therefore, we do not have a prediction 
on the direction of the relationship between Leverage and IFRS adoption. 
Assuming fixed cost components of IFRS adoption, adopting IFRS should be less 
expensive for larger firms.  Accordingly, we control for Size, the log of total assets.  We also 
                                                 
23
 Bandyopadhyay et al. (1994) find that earnings scaled by market capitalization are 2% lower under U.S. GAAP 
than Canadian GAAP. Since the time of Bandyopadhyay et al. (1994)’s study, U.S. GAAP and Canadian GAAP 
have become even more similar.  From 1995 to 2004, the AcSB focused on harmonizing Canadian GAAP with U.S. 
GAAP by adopting standards that reduced differences between the two accounting standards (Discussion Paper of 
Accounting Standards in Canada: Future Directions June 24, 2004).  
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control for a firm’s operating performance which may affect a firm’s ability to fund IFRS 
adoption.  Specifically, we include ROA, net income scaled by total assets, as our measure of 
operating performance.  Since both Size and ROA may proxy for other constructs (including 
information environment, level of enforcement, and political costs), we do not make directional 
predictions for these two variables.  
Finally, cross-country studies examining earnings quality and legal origin generally find 
that earnings quality is higher in common law countries (e.g., Ball et al. 2000) than in civil law 
countries.  Cascino and Gassen (2015) document intra-country variation in the consequences of 
IFRS adoption in Germany and Italy.  While Canada is predominantly a common law country, 
the province of Quebec has civil law legal origin with political and economic ties may be closer 
to France for Quebec relative to other provinces, see Filip et al. (2015) on the link to earnings 
quality within Canada.  To control for variation in legal origin within Canada, we use an 
indicator variable, Code, equal to 1 if a firm is domiciled in Quebec, and 0 otherwise.  A positive 
coefficient on Code implies that Quebec based companies are more likely to adopt IFRS.  Thus, 
we expect a positive coefficient for Code. 
Empirical results for determinants of firms’ accounting standard choice 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 170 U.S.-listed Canadian firms reporting 
under Canadian GAAP with a choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP and with necessary 
financial information (see Table 1, Panel B for details of the sample formation). The difference 
in CAN-US GAAP Distance is consistent with differences in reported results playing an 
important role in choosing between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.  The mean and median of CAN-US 
GAAP Distance are statistically significantly larger for firms that choose IFRS based on a t-test 
of difference in means and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test, respectively.  The 
 21 
mean of -0.12 for firms that choose U.S. GAAP indicates that on average stockholders’ equity of 
firms that choose U.S. GAAP is larger under U.S. GAAP than Canadian GAAP.  The positive 
mean and median indicate that the opposite is true for firms that adopt IFRS.  This is consistent 
with firms choosing the standard which results in the highest reported equity.  On average, 35% 
of firms that adopt U.S. GAAP have R&D expense compared to 16% of firms that adopt IFRS. 
The t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test both indicate that this difference is 
statistically significant. One issue with this univariate analysis of R&D is that a high proportion 
of firms that adopt IFRS are in the mining industry and do not engage in R&D activities. Thus, 
multivariate testing where we control for industry is necessary to make valid inferences.  
Exploration measures the analog of R&D in the mineral resource industries. Twenty-nine percent 
of firms adopting IFRS report exploration expense compared to just four percent of firms 
adopting U.S. GAAP, with the difference being statistically significant at the five percent level.  
This is consistent with firms in the mineral resource industry reporting exploration expense 
preferring the earlier capitalization of exploration costs permitted by IFRS compared to U.S. 
GAAP. 
Comparability with global industry peers appears to be an important determinant of 
choosing an accounting standard.  Ninety percent of firms that adopt IFRS are in two-digit SIC 
industry group where IFRS is the predominant standard compared to only 57% of firms that 
choose U.S. GAAP; the difference is statistically significant.  Consistent with IFRS 
Predominant, the differences in IFRS vs. US Operations suggest that comparability with peer 
firms plays an important role in firms’ decisions between the two standards.  The mean (median) 
of -0.25 (-0.15) for IFRS vs. US Operations for firms that choose U.S. GAAP indicates that on 
average they have more operations in the U.S., while the mean (median) of 0.16 (0.00) of IFRS 
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vs. US Operations for firms that choose IFRS indicates that firms that choose IFRS have more 
operations in IFRS-based countries.  
Neither the mean nor the median of US Ownership are statistically significantly different, 
contrary to our expectation.  However, this is likely due to measurement error in the proxy since 
institutional investors tend to invest in large companies.  Multivariate testing that controls for 
size is necessary to control for this weakness in this variable.  The descriptive statistics indicate 
that firms choosing U.S. GAAP are not statistically significantly different from firms that choose 
IFRS in terms of Leverage, Size, or ROA.  
Panel B of Table 2 documents that 67% of firms that chose IFRS are in the mining 
industry, in contrast, to 30% of firms that chose U.S. GAAP. Our Exploration variable examines 
whether accounting method differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP that might motivate 
mining firms to choose IFRS.  
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlations.  The Pearson and Spearman correlations 
indicate that adopting IFRS is positively and statistically significantly correlated with CAN-US 
GAAP Distance and Exploration, consistent with an accounting standard’s impact on reported 
results affecting which standard firms choose. IFRS Predominant and IFRS vs. US Operations 
are positively and statistically significantly correlated with adopting IFRS, suggesting that the 
impact of reported results and comparability with peer firms are important determinants of firms’ 
choice between the two standards.
24
  The high and statistically significant Pearson (Spearman) 
correlation of 0.50 (0.57) between US Ownership and Size highlights the measurement error in 
US Ownership caused by institutional investors preference for investing in large stocks and 
confirms the need to control for size when using our proxy. 
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 IFRS Predominant and IFRS vs. US Operations both proxy for the same construct and have a relatively low, but 
statistically significant correlation. If we include only IFRS Predominant or only IFRS vs. US Operations, our 
results presented in Table 4 are qualitatively similar.  
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Table 4 reports coefficients, z-statistics, and marginal effects for the probit regression 
analysis of firms’ standard choice.  We calculate the marginal effect of each independent 
variable as π(x) = Φ(x'β), where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution and x’ and β represent the vector of independent variables and corresponding 
coefficient estimates from equation (1). We use the values zero and one for indicator variables 
and the first and third quartiles for continuous independent variables, with the remaining 
independent variables set equal to their mean values.  We then compute the difference in π(x) at 
these two values of each independent variable, x.   
The effect of the standard choice on reported results is a significant determinant in firms’ 
decision between standards.  The coefficient on CAN-US GAAP Distance is 0.42 and statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level (z-statistic of 1.59).  The marginal effect indicates that as 
Canadian GAAP portrays the net assets of the firm in a more favorable light than US GAAP, 
firms are 1.1 percent more likely to adopt IFRS when moving from the first quartile to the third 
quartile CAN-US GAAP Distance.
25
  R&D is positive but not statistically significant. Thus, we 
are unable to document that firms with R&D activities prefer the capitalization approach under 
IFRS to U.S. GAAP, or vice versa.
26
 Our failure to reject the null may also stem from 
measurement error in the recording of R&D documented in recent work by Koh and Reeb 
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 We acknowledge that Canadian GAAP net assets being higher than those under U.S. GAAP does not necessarily 
mean that IFRS will result in higher reported net assets than US GAAP.  For the firms that adopt IFRS, we are able 
to provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis because we have these firms reported stockholders’ equity under 
IFRS and U.S. GAAP for the year prior to IFRS adoption. Sixty-two percent of the time IFRS is higher than U.S. 
GAAP and the mean and median stockholders’ equity are statistically significantly higher under IFRS than U.S. 
GAAP. 
26
 A trade off of using a dummy variable for R&D is that it eliminates information about how important R&D 
activities are to a firm. The most common alternative approach is to scale R&D expense by sales. We do not find a 
relationship between IFRS adoption and R&D expense scaled by sales; however, we lose 50 firms because they do 
not have sales, many of which are early stage companies where R&D activities are very important to the firm. 
Alternatively, when we scaled R&D expense by total assets, we do find a positive and statistically significant 
association between IFRS adoption and R&D. Thus, the inferences regarding the relationship between R&D 
activities and IFRS adoption are sensitive to how we measure R&D activities for a firm. 
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(2015). The coefficient on Exploration is 0.67 and statistically significant (z-statistic of 1.34).
27
 
This suggests firms reporting exploration expense prefer the capitalization approach under IFRS 
to U.S. GAAP as they are 3.2% more likely to choose IFRS than U.S. GAAP. Overall, these 
results are consistent with firms’ choice of standard being affected by the differences in 
permitted accounting methods between the standards. 
Table 4 indicates that comparability with peer firms is an important determinant of 
accounting standard choice. The coefficient on IFRS Predominant of 1.18 is positive and 
statistically significant (z-statistic of 2.38).  The marginal effect indicates that firms are 16.7 
percent more likely to adopt IFRS if they are in an industry where IFRS is the most common 
standard among the top 20 firms in a two-digit SIC industry group.  The location of firm’s 
foreign operations is also an important determinant of firms’ choice in accounting standard as 
indicated by the statistically significant coefficient of 1.04 (z-statistic of 2.90) on IFRS vs. US 
Operations.  Firms with operations in a foreign jurisdiction are likely competing with peer firms 
in those locations; the marginal effect of 4.1 percent suggests comparability with peer firms in 
those jurisdictions is important. 
Firms with higher U.S. investor ownership are more likely to choose U.S. GAAP than 
IFRS as evidenced by the statistically significant coefficient of -1.80 (z-statistic of -1.49) on US 
Ownership where the marginal effect is -2.4 percent.  These results highlight the importance of 
controlling for size when using this proxy.  
The result for Leverage provides evidence about the role of costs in firms’ decisions 
between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.  The coefficient on Leverage is not statistically significant. This 
may be because debt renegotiation costs were not material, the adoption of IFRS had differing 
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 We find similar results if we use a continuous variable where exploration expense is scaled by total assets. 
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effects for firms, moving some firms closer and some firms farther from their covenants, or 
measurement error in Leverage as a proxy for nearness to financial debt covenants. 
Size is significantly and positively correlated with the likelihood that firms adopt IFRS 
with a coefficient estimate of 0.23 (z-statistic of 2.88).  The marginal effect is economically 
significant at 6.3 percent.  This result is consistent with a fixed cost component to IFRS adoption 
that makes adoption relatively less costly for larger firms.  Performance as measured by ROA is 
not statistically significantly associated with firms’ standard choice. As expected, the coefficient 
on Code is positive, 5.47, and statistically significant (z-statistic of 11.42), likely due to the close 
political and economic ties between Quebec and France. 
 
5. Earnings quality effects of IFRS adoption in Canada 
We extend our analysis of the choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP for Canadian firms 
cross-listed in the U.S. by examining whether the choice affects earnings quality.  A priori, the 
effects of transitioning from Canadian GAAP to IFRS or U.S. GAAP on earnings quality are not 
clear.  If enforcement and other financial reporting incentives are the primary determinants of 
earnings quality, then changing accounting standards may not affect earnings quality. If, 
however, the differences between the three standards are material and enforced, they may affect 
earnings quality.  A useful feature of the Canadian setting is the high enforcement both before 
and after IFRS adoption (e.g., Jackson and Roe 2009).  High enforcement implies that Canadian 
firms adopting IFRS and U.S. GAAP are required to faithfully implement each of these standards 
in contrast to many European countries where enforcement is relatively low.  The lack of 
concurrent changes in enforcement around IFRS adoption permits a relatively clean setting to 
study the effects of changing accounting standards (e.g., Christensen et al. 2013).   
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Providing managers discretion to make estimates is an essential requirement for 
informative financial reporting.  An inherent trade off of providing managers with more 
discretion is that they may use it either for signaling or to make opportunistic financial reporting 
decisions (Subramanyam 1996, Healy and Palepu 2001).  Thus, the optimal amount of discretion 
accounting standards should provide is not clear.  Canadian GAAP, IFRS, and U.S. GAAP 
provide different amounts of discretion over financial reporting to managers.  Both Canadian 
GAAP and IFRS are perceived as more principles-based standards relative to U.S. GAAP, which 
is perceived as more rules-based.  Among the more principles-based standards, Canadian GAAP 
provides more detailed guidance than IFRS.  As a representative example, revenue recognition 
under Canadian GAAP and IFRS is similar at a conceptual level, but Canadian GAAP provides 
specific criteria related to the existence of an arrangement, the occurrence of delivery or 
rendering of services, and whether the seller’s price to the buyer is fixed or determinable; 
Canadian GAAP also provides detailed guidance for multiple-element arrangements that is not 
present in IFRS (BDO 2008).  The lack of detailed implementation guidance provides managers 
reporting under IFRS more discretion.
28
  U.S. GAAP generally provides even more detailed 
guidance than Canadian GAAP.  The SEC published a detailed comparison of U.S. GAAP and 
IFRS noting that the substantial differences between the two standards arise from U.S. GAAP 
providing more detailed industry- and transaction-specific guidance than IFRS (SEC 2011a).  
The net result of this difference is that IFRS provides managers more discretion than U.S. 
GAAP. 
We focus on two earnings quality attributes that are likely to capture whether greater 
discretion under IFRS compared to Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP improves financial 
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 IFRS permits true and fair override when compliance would not give a true and fair view.  Canadian GAAP and 
U.S. GAAP do not permit override.  
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reporting quality.  Investors’ valuation demand leads them to prefer current earnings that predict 
a firm’s future earnings.  Providing managers more discretion can have one of two effects: (1) 
enable them to report current earnings that better signal future earnings, or (2) reduce earnings 
predictive value because managers use their discretion opportunistically. Following prior 
literature (e.g., Subramanyam 1996), we examine whether discretion improves or decreases 
earnings quality by examining earnings persistence.  Prior literature interprets income-increasing 
accruals as well as large unsigned accruals (i.e., the absolute value of accruals) as indicators of 
accrual aggressiveness (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2013, Becker et al. 1998).  Consistent with this 
literature, we examine whether adoption of IFRS and U.S. GAAP is associated with an increase 
in managers’ discretionary use of income-increasing accruals and with the magnitude of 
unsigned accruals. 
The differences between Canadian GAAP, IFRS, and U.S. GAAP may also affect the 
earnings attribute timeliness of loss recognition.  Basu (1997) argues that higher verification 
standards for gains than losses results in losses being incorporated into earnings on a timelier 
basis than gains.  Kothari et al. (2010) argue that this attribute is desirable because managers 
have incentives that raise fundamental questions about the credibility of their performance 
reporting related to positive news.  Differences between Canadian GAAP, IFRS, and U.S. GAAP 
relating to measurement of assets may result in reduced timeliness of loss recognition under 
IFRS.  Specifically, both Canadian GAAP and IFRS require asset impairments to be recorded 
(IFRS generally results in more impairments because it does not use the recoverability test and 
applies the analysis to the individual asset level), but IFRS requires the reversal of impairment 
losses, except for goodwill, when a change in estimates has been used to determine the 
recoverable amount.  In contrast, Canadian GAAP prohibits any reversal of impairment losses. 
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Further, IFRS permits revaluation of PP&E and intangibles to fair value when fair value can be 
measured reliably (and then firms must consistently update).  The effect of these differences is 
that the verification standard for losses and gains is more symmetric under IFRS than under 
Canadian GAAP.  Kothari et al. (2010) argue that such reversals are likely less credible because 
of managers’ financial reporting incentives.  Asset measurement under U.S. GAAP is generally 
similar to Canadian GAAP, except with respect to inventory write-downs. Canadian GAAP 
permits the reversal of inventory write-downs to net realizable value (as does IFRS), whereas, 
U.S. GAAP does not permit such reversals.  Thus, under U.S. GAAP unrealized gains are 
reported on a less timely basis than either IFRS or Canadian GAAP.  This may manifest itself in 
more asymmetric recognition of bad news relative to good news under U.S. GAAP and less 
asymmetric recognition of bad news relative to good news under IFRS.   As such, we examine 
the impact of IFRS and U.S. GAAP adoption on the earnings attribute timeliness of loss 
recognition as measured by Basu (1997). 
  
Data and research design 
From the 170 U.S.-listed Canadian firms that were previously using Canadian GAAP and 
had a choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP, we identify firms with sufficient data in Compustat 
to calculate our three measures of earnings quality.  As Table 1, Panel C reports this yields a 
sample of 141 firms, 122 of which adopted IFRS and 19 that adopted U.S. GAAP.  Consistent 
with Ahmed et al. (2013) we exclude the first year under IFRS or U.S. GAAP as including this 
year would contaminate our tests by mixing earnings reported under IFRS or U.S. GAAP with 
Canadian GAAP due to the lagged data requirement for certain attributes.  We require firms to 
have at least one year of data before and one year after the year of IFRS or U.S. GAAP adoption 
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(which requires two years of data before and after the year of IFRS or U.S. GAAP adoption 
because of the use of lagged data).  If a firm has two firm-year observations of data before IFRS 
or U.S. adoption and two year firm-year observations of data after, then we keep both years.  If a 
firm has only one firm-year of data before or after its change in accounting standard, then we 
only keep one firm-year of data before and after the change in accounting standard.  For our 
sample of 141 firms, this results in a total of 488 firm-year observations. 
Table 5 documents the descriptive statistics for the variables used to estimate earnings 
quality for the firms that chose U.S. GAAP relative to those that chose IFRS.  While most 
variables are not statistically significantly different between the two samples, there are 
exceptions.  First, the mean and median current and lagged earnings per share are statistically 
significantly higher for firms that choose IFRS.  Consistent with this, the mean and median of 
EARN are statistically significantly higher for firms that choose IFRS.  Second, the mean and 
median RET are also statistically significantly higher for firms that choose IFRS.  Third, the 
median cash flows are statistically significantly higher for firms that adopt IFRS.  Finally, as 
expected, the mean and median Mills is statistically significantly lower for firms that adopt IFRS.   
We study this sample of firms because they have a choice between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.  
The challenge of this choice is that since firms are not randomly assigned to an accounting 
standard, selection bias may affect inferences about earnings quality.  To control for potential 
selection bias, we follow the procedure developed by Heckman (1979) that uses our analysis in 
Table 4 as a first-stage selection model and then incorporate the inverse Mills’ ratio in our 
regressions of earnings quality.
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  We employ a pre-post research design that uses each firm as 
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 Lennox et al. (2012) note the challenge of using this procedure is identifying variables in the first stage that are 
exogenous to the outcome variable in the second stage.  In our sensitivity analysis, we follow their suggestion and 
run our analysis without the inverse Mills’ ratio.  We find qualitatively similar results as those presented.  
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its own control and examines the difference-in-differences between firms that choose IFRS to 
firms that choose U.S. GAAP after controlling for self-selection.
30
 
We measure persistence as the slope coefficient in the regression of current earnings on 
lagged earnings as follows: 
 Xt = ϕ0 + ϕ 1 Xt-1 + ϕ 2 Postt + ϕ 3 Postt * Xt-1 + ϕ 4 IFRSt + ϕ 5 IFRSt*Postt  
    + ϕ 6 IFRSt* Xt-1 + ϕ 7 IFRSt* Postt*Xt-1 + ϕ 8 Millst + εt          (2) 
where X is the annual split-adjusted earnings per share (measured as a firm’s net income before 
extraordinary items divided by the weighted average number of outstanding shares).  Larger 
values of  indicate more permanent earnings while lower values of  indicate more transitory 
earnings.  Post is equal to one after a firm adopts IFRS or U.S. GAAP, and zero otherwise.  IFRS 
is equal to one if a firm adopts IFRS, and zero otherwise (i.e., a firm adopts U.S. GAAP).  Mills 
is the inverse Mills’ ratio from the choice model in Table 4.  ϕ3 indicates whether earnings 
persistence changes after our sample firms adopt their new standard, and ϕ7 measures if 
persistence changes more or less for firms that adopt IFRS relative to those who adopt U.S. 
GAAP.  The differences between Canadian GAAP, IFRS, and U.S. GAAP do not lead to 
directional predictions as the changes in discretion may lead to more or less persistence earnings.  
We cluster standard errors by firm and industry (Gow et al. 2010). 
Following Ahmed et al. (2013) we examine signed accruals, which assumes managers’ 
preference is to increase earnings with income-increasing accruals. Prior literature documents 
many settings where managers use their discretion to decrease earnings with income-decreasing 
accruals (e.g., Healy 1985, Jones 1991, etc.). To capture this broader use of accruals to manage 
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 This approach may not adequately control for contemporaneous earnings quality effects that are unrelated to the 
adoption of IFRS or U.S. GAAP.  In our sensitivity analysis, we perform an untabulated matched-pair research 
design where we match our sample firms to U.S. firms based on year and industry as well as size, growth 
opportunities, and return on assets.  We find qualitatively similar results to those presented using U.S. firms as a 
benchmark. See the Sensitivity analyses section for details. 
1 1
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earnings, particularly since our theory about the differences of IFRS and U.S. GAAP for accruals 
does not predict a specific direction (income-increasing or income-decreasing), we examine the 
absolute (unsigned) value of accruals. Our regression model is as follows:  
ACCt  or |ACCt|= γ0 + γ 1 IFRSt + γ 2 Postt + γ 3 IFRSt * Postt  + γ 4 ΔRevt - ΔRect  
          + γ 5 PPEt + γ 6 BTMt + γ 7 CFt + γ 8 1/Assetst + γ 9 Millst + εt       (3) 
where ACC is net income less cash flows from operations scaled by average total assets and 
|ACC| is the absolute value of ACC. γ2 measures if accruals change after firms’ adopt the new 
standard and γ3 measures whether the change is different for firms that adopt IFRS relative to 
firms that adopt U.S. GAAP.  As with persistence, the differences between Canadian GAAP, 
IFRS, and U.S. GAAP do not lead to directional predictions as the changes in discretion may 
lead to more or less aggressive accruals.  Following the modified Jones model from Dechow et 
al. (1995), normal accruals are modeled as a function of the level of property, plant and 
equipment and the change in revenue less the change in receivables, which asumes that accruals 
arising from a change in credit policy reflect discretionary choices. ΔRev - ΔRec is the change in 
revenue less the change in receivables scaled by average total assets. PPE is gross property, 
plant, and equipment scaled by average total assets. In addition to controlling for current growth, 
we follow Larcker and Richardson (2004) and control for expected future growth in firms’ 
operations and the correlated investment in working capital using BTM, the ratio of the book 
value of equity to the market value of equity.  Prior literature (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995) 
documents cash flows from operations are negatively correlated with accruals. As such we 
include CF, the cash flows from operations scaled by average total assets. 1/Assets is equal to 1 
scaled by average total assets.  We cluster standard errors by firm and industry (Gow et al. 2010). 
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To examine the timeliness of loss recognition, we use the following reverse regression of 
earnings on returns based on Basu (1997): 
EARNt = α0 + α 1 RETt + α 2 NEGt + α 3 RETt * NEGt + α 4 Postt + α 5 Postt* RETt 
          + α 6 Postt* NEGt + α 7 Postt*RETt * NEGt + α 8 IFRSt +  α 9 IFRSt * RETt 
          + α 10 IFRSt * NEGt + α 11 IFRSt *RETt * NEGt + α 12 IFRSt * Postt  
          + α 13 IFRSt *Postt* RETt + α 14 IFRSt *Postt* NEGt  
           + α 15 IFRSt *Postt*RETt * NEGt + εt                           (4) 
where EARN is income before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity at the 
beginning of the year. RET is the 12-month return ending three months after the fiscal year end. 
NEG is equal to 1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise.  α7 measures if the timeliness of  loss 
recognition changes after firms’ adopt the new standard and α15 measure whether the change in 
timeliness of loss recognition is different for firms that adopt IFRS relative to firms that adopt 
U.S. GAAP.  The differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP suggest that α15 is likely to be 
negative.  We cluster standard errors by firm and industry (Gow et al. 2010). 
Empirical results for IFRS and U.S. GAAP adoption on earnings quality 
Table 6 presents the impact of adopting IFRS versus U.S. GAAP on earnings persistence.  
Our analysis employs a difference-in-difference research design comparing the earnings 
persistence of firms before and after adopting IFRS to firms adopting U.S. GAAP after 
controlling for selection bias using the inverse Mills’ ratio.  The coefficient on Xt-1 of 0.69 is 
positive and significant (t-statistic of 11.82) as expected.  The interaction of Post and Xt-1 
indicates that the earnings persistence is not statistically significantly different after firms change 
standards.  We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that earnings quality is not different before 
and after IFRS or U.S. GAAP adoption. The interaction of IFRS, Post, and Xt-1 indicates that 
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after adopting IFRS earnings persistence is not statistically significantly different than firms 
adopting U.S. GAAP.  Thus, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that earnings quality is 
not different after firms adopt IFRS relative to firms that adopt U.S. GAAP. The statistically 
significant coefficient of 1.37 (t-statistic of 1.88) on Mills indicates that selection bias is present.  
Table 7 documents the impact of adopting IFRS versus U.S. GAAP on accruals. Our two 
variables of interest, Post and the interaction of IFRS and Post, are not statistically significantly 
different from zero for either signed accruals or the absolute value of accruals. Thus, we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that accruals are not different after adopting IFRS or U.S. 
GAAP, nor are we able to reject the null that accruals do not differ for firms that adopt IFRS 
compared to firms that adopt U.S. GAAP after adopting their respective new standard. PPE and 
CF are statistically significant (t-statistics of -1.89 and -2.23, respectively) with their predicted 
signs in the signed accruals model while ΔRev – ΔRec and CF are statistically significant (t-
statistics of 1.51 and -1.55, respectively) with their predicted signs in the absolute value of 
accruals model. The statistically insignificant coefficient on Mills fails to indicate the presence of 
selection bias. 
Table 8 examines the impact of IFRS versus U.S. GAAP on the timeliness of loss 
recognition. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction of RET and NEG of 0.41 is positive 
and statistically significant (t-statistic of 1.41) indicating that earnings reflect bad news on a 
more timely basis than good news for these firms both before and after IFRS or U.S. GAAP 
adoption. The lack of a statistically significant coefficient on the interaction of Post, RET, and 
NEG means we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that timeliness of loss recognition did not 
change after firms adopted IFRS or U.S. GAAP.  Further, the lack of a statistically significant 
coefficient on the interaction of IFRS, Post, RET, and NEG consistent with the null hypothesis 
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that the timeliness of loss recognition did not change more for firms after IFRS than those 
adopting U.S. GAAP. Thus, despite measurement differences under IFRS that likely render 
earnings reported using IFRS less asymmetric with respect to recognition of gains and losses 
than under Canadian GAAP or U.S. GAAP, we do not find evidence of less timely loss 
recognition for firms that adopt IFRS.  
Overall, we are unable to document that earnings quality changed for firms adopting 
IFRS or U.S. GAAP or that adopting IFRS affected earnings quality more or less than firms 
adopting U.S. GAAP after controlling for selection bias.  Our small sample of 19 firms adopting 
U.S. GAAP may result in insufficient statistical power to detect an effect.  Our sample of firms 
that adopt IFRS at 122 is larger and results in a more powerful test of the effects of IFRS 
adoption on earnings quality than the sample firms that adopt U.S. GAAP.  With this larger 
sample, we are unable to document changes in earnings quality.  Overall, these results inform 
U.S. regulators considering whether to permit or require IFRS reporting by U.S. firms. 
Sensitivity analyses 
 Approximately 35 percent of the firms in our sample are Development Stage Enterprises 
(DSEs)
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 where earnings may be less informative than the earnings of non-DSE firms 
(Willenborg 1999).  In untabulated analysis, we reran our tests using only non-DSE firms. Our 
results are consistent with those presented in Tables 6 – 8 where we are unable to document 
significant changes in earnings quality after changing accounting standards.  
 Lennox et al. (2012) discuss the difficulties of controlling for selection bias using two-
stage approaches like the one we employ.  The primary challenge is that identifying a variable 
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 Accounting Standards Codification 915-10-05 states that a DSE “will typically be devoting most if its efforts to 
activities such as the following: a. Financial planning b. Raising capital c. Exploring for natural resources d. 
Developing natural resources e. Research and development f. Establishing sources of supply g. Acquiring property, 
plant, and equipment, or other operating assets, such as mineral rights h. Recruiting and training personnel i. 
Developing markets j. Starting up production.” 
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that has high explanatory power in the first stage, but is uncorrelated with the independent 
variable in the second stage.  Technically, such a variable is not necessary since functional form 
assumptions can serve as a basis for identification, but this requires making an assumption about 
the functional form that may not be true.  Lennox et al. (2012) document that including the 
inverse Mills’ ratio can bias results more than using ordinary least squares regression.  They 
suggest researchers examine results excluding the inverse Mills’ ratio using ordinary least 
squares.  In untabulated analysis, when we perform the analysis presented in Tables 6 – 8 
excluding the inverse Mills’ ratio, we find qualitatively similar results.  
 Our analyses in Tables 6, 7 and 8 employ a pre-post research design that uses firms as 
their own control after attempting to control for selection bias.  A shortcoming of this approach 
is the lack of adequate controls for contemporaneous earnings quality effects that are unrelated to 
the adoption of IFRS or U.S. GAAP.  Using a control sample that is subject to these 
contemporaneous earnings quality effects, but unaffected by the change in accounting standard 
can mitigate this concern.  In untabulated analysis, we match our Canadian firms to U.S. firms 
following the matching procedure in Ahmed et al. (2013).  Specifically, we match Canadian 
firms, without replacement, to U.S. firms in the year prior to the adoption of their new standard 
and in the same industry (using SIC Divisions A-J classifications) that minimizes a penalty score 
based on three observable dimensions that affect earnings quality: size, growth opportunities, and 
return on assets.  The penalty score is calculated as: 
((MVC – MVU)/MVC)
2
 + ((BTMC – BTMU)/ BTMC)
2
 + ((ROAC – ROAU)/ ROAC)
2
 
where MVC (MVU) are market values of equity, BTMC (BTMU) are the book-to-market ratios, and 
ROAC (ROAU) are return on assets for Canadian (U.S.) firms.  The procedure yields quality 
matches as the Canadian firms and their matched U.S. pairs are not statistically significantly 
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different along these dimensions.  We retain the same overlapping annual periods for the 
matched-pairs of U.S. firms as used for the sample firms.  Using this difference-in-difference-in-
differences research design, we continue to find similar results to those presented in Tables 6 – 8 
and are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no differences in earnings quality before and after 
IFRS or U.S. GAAP adoption.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. were permitted to report under either IFRS or U.S. 
GAAP.  We document that more Canadian firms report using U.S. GAAP after 2011.  We also 
document the determinants of Canadian firms’ choice between accounting standards, IFRS or 
U.S. GAAP and find that cross-listed firms are more likely to choose IFRS if IFRS is the 
standard most commonly used by the leading global firms in their industry. In addition, we find 
that the firms more likely to choose IFRS are larger, of civil law legal origin, have fewer U.S. 
operations, report exploration expense, have fewer U.S. shareholders and report higher 
stockholders’ equity under Canadian GAAP than under U.S. GAAP.  
We also investigate effects of IFRS adoption on earnings quality measures that are 
predicted to arise from differences between the three accounting standards – Canadian GAAP, 
IFRS, and U.S. GAAP.  Our earnings quality analyses fail to document changes around IFRS or 
U.S. GAAP adoption.  Inability to reject the null hypothesis of no change in earnings quality 
around the time when firms became required to abandon Canadian GAAP clearly does not imply 
that the null hypothesis is true.  Nevertheless, our findings of accounting standards choice appear 
consistent with the successful transition to co-existence of two accounting standards in the 
Canadian markets.  The coexistence of two standards likely lowered transition costs.  Given the 
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similarities between the Canadian and U.S. setting, and between IFRS and U.S. GAAP, these 
findings provide insights into the debate over whether the SEC should permit U.S. firms to 
choose between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. 
Future research might investigate other economic consequences of IFRS adoption in 
Canada.  For example, did non-cross-listed public Canadian firms delist to avoid IFRS adoption 
or did private Canadian firms favor takeovers (becoming acquired) over IPOs?  Did accounting 
comparability decrease as a result of Canada permitting cross-listed firms to choose between 
IFRS and US GAAP?  Answering these questions could further inform continuing deliberations 
in the U.S. whether the SEC should permit or require some or all U.S. firms choose between 
IFRS and U.S. GAAP.   
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Appendix 
Variable definitions 
 
1/Assets: 1 scaled by average total assets (Compustat: AT).  
 
BTM: The book value of equity (Compustat: CEQ) divided by the market value of equity 
(Compustat: CSHO*PRCC_F).  
 
CAN-US GAAP Distance: The percentage difference between the stockholders' equity under 
Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP calculated as Canadian GAAP stockholders' equity less U.S. 
GAAP stockholders' equity divided by the absolute value of Canadian GAAP stockholders' 
equity based on hand-collected data from SEDAR.  
 
CF: The cash flows from operations (Compustat: OANCF) scaled by average total assets 
(Compustat: AT).  
 
Code: An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is domiciled in Quebec (Compustat: STATE = 
“QC”), and 0 otherwise. 
 
EARN: Income before extraordinary items (Compustat: IB) scaled by the market value of equity 
(Compustat: CSHO*PRCC_F) at the beginning of the year. 
 
Exploration: An indicator variable equal to 1 if exploration expense (Compustat: MMXPX or 
OGXPX) is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. 
 
IFRS: An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm adopts IFRS, and 0 otherwise (i.e., a firm adopts 
U.S. GAAP). 
 
IFRS Predominant: An indicator variable equal to 1 if IFRS is the most commonly used 
accounting standard among the 20 largest global firms (based on market value (Compustat 
Global: CSHOC*PRCCD) in a given two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise.  
 
IFRS vs. US Operations: The assets in IFRS countries less assets in the U.S. divided by total 
assets based on hand-collected data from SEDAR.  
 
Leverage: Debt (Compustat: DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets (Computstat: AT).  
 
MV: Market value of equity (Compustat: CSHO*PRCC_F). 
 
Mills: The inverse Mills' ratio calculated from the probit regression firms' standard choice in 
Table 4. 
 
NEG: An indicator variable equal to 1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Post: An indicator variable equal to 1 after the adoption either IFRS or U.S. GAAP, and 0 
otherwise. 
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PPE: Gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat: PPEGT) scaled by average total assets 
(Compustat: AT).    
 
R&D: An indicator variable equal to 1 if R&D expense (Compustat: XRD) is greater than 0, and 
0 otherwise.  
 
RET: The 12-month return ending three months after the fiscal year end using price data from 
Compustat. 
 
ΔRev – ΔRec: The change in revenue (Compustat: SALE) less the change in receivables 
(Compustat: RECT) scaled by average total assets (Compustat: AT).   
 
ROA: Net income (Compustat: NI) divided by total assets (Compustat: AT).  
 
Size: The log of total assets (Compustat: AT).  
 
US Ownership: The percentage of common stock held by U.S. institutional investors (based on 
13F filings with the SEC).  
 
X: The annual split-adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (Compustat: EPSPX 
divided by AJEX). 
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Sample formation
Listed in U.S. one year 
prior to accounting 
standard choice?
Accounting standard 
prior to 2006* IFRS U.S. GAAP Total
U.S. GAAP 3 45 48
Canadian GAAP 163 34 197
Total 166 79 245
Panel B: Sample used in standard choice cnalysis
Firms Listed in U.S. and Using Canadian GAAP 197
No disclosure of reconciliation to U.S. GAAP (10)
Foreign assets not disclosed (9)
Lost FPI Status and forced to use U.S. GAAP (5)
Rate-regulated entities (3)
Firms used in standard choice analysis 170
Panel C: Sample used in earnings quality analysis
Firms used in standard choice analysis 170
Firms without Compustat data to calculate measures of earnings quality (29)
Firms used in earnings quality analysis 141
Notes:
*If a firm's inception is in 2006 or later, the firm's first accounting standard is reported. 
TABLE 1
The sample consists of Canadian firms in Compustat that were listed in the U.S. and required to adopt either IFRS 
or U.S. GAAP.   
Accounting standard adopted
Yes
Panel A: Sample and adoption of IFRS or U.S. GAAP conditional on previous accounting standard
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TABLE 2
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
CAN-US GAAP Distance -0.12 0.00 0.27**  0.07***
R&D 0.35 0.00 0.16**  0.00**  
Exploration 0.04 0.00 0.29**  0.00**  
IFRS Predominant 0.57 1.00 0.90*** 1.00***
IFRS vs. US Operations -0.25 -0.15 0.16*** 0.00***
US Ownership 0.14 0.01 0.12      0.06      
Leverage 0.19 0.17 0.15      0.05      
Size 4.98 4.79 5.63      5.32      
ROA -0.21 -0.03 -0.22      -0.04      
Code 0.00 0.00 0.07      0.00      
Panel B: Distribution of accounting standards by industry
Industry (Two-Digit SIC Codes) Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Mining (10-14) 7 30% 98 67%
Manufacturing (20-39) 9 39% 24 16%
Transportation and Utilities (40-49) 3 13% 4 3%
Services (70-89) 2 9% 7 5%
Other 2 9% 14 10%
Total 23 100% 147 100%
Notes:
Descriptive statistics for firms used in standard choice analysis
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
The sample consists of 170 Canadian firms previously using Canadian GAAP and listed in the U.S. 
CAN-US GAAP Distance  is the percentage difference between the stockholders' equity under 
Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP calculated as Canadian GAAP stockholders' equity less U.S. GAAP 
stockholders' equity scaled by the absolute value of Canadian GAAP stockholders' equity. R&D is 
equal to 1 if R&D Expense is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. Exploration  is equal to 1 if exploration 
expense is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. IFRS Predominant  is equal to 1 if IFRS is the most 
commonly used accounting standard among the 20 largest global firms (based on market value) in a 
given two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise. IFRS vs. US Operations indicates whether more of a firms' 
assets are located in IFRS countries or the U.S. and is calculated as assets in IFRS countries less assets 
in the U.S. scaled by total assets. US Ownership  is the percentage of common stock held by U.S. 
institutional investors. Leverage  is debt divided by total assets. Size  is the log of total assets. ROA  is 
net income divided by total assets. Code  is equal to 1 if the firm is domiciled in Quebec, and 0 
otherwise."Other" consists of Agriculture (01-09), Finance (60-67), and Wholesale Trade (50-51). *, 
**, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and , 0.01 levels (one-tailed when predicted 
direction), respectively, based on t-test for the difference in means and a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test for the difference in medians.
U.S. GAAP (N=23) IFRS (N=147)
U.S. GAAP IFRS
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IFRS
CAN-US GAAP 
Distance R&D Exploration
IFRS 
Predominant
IFRS vs. US 
Operations
US 
Ownership Leverage Size ROA Code
IFRS 1.00 0.22 -0.17 0.19 0.12 0.25 0.01 -0.10 0.07 0.01 0.10
CAN-US GAAP Distance 0.18 1.00 -0.14 -0.07 0.22 0.04 -0.19 -0.21 -0.14 -0.18 0.02
R&D -0.17 -0.05 1.00 -0.24 -0.11 -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 -0.21 -0.15 0.27
Exploration 0.19 -0.07 -0.24 1.00 0.17 0.23 0.13 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09
IFRS Predominant 0.12 0.14 -0.11 0.17 1.00 0.15 -0.18 -0.09 -0.29 -0.14 0.01
IFRS vs. US Operations 0.25 0.10 -0.05 0.21 0.14 1.00 0.12 0.00 -0.07 -0.09 -0.01
US Ownership -0.04 -0.19 -0.06 0.07 -0.23 0.13 1.00 0.28 0.57 0.36 0.00
Leverage -0.06 -0.10 0.03 -0.14 0.00 0.10 0.08 1.00 0.50 0.31 0.10
Size 0.07 -0.17 -0.21 -0.03 -0.35 -0.05 0.50 0.12 1.00 0.67 -0.02
ROA 0.00 -0.14 -0.19 0.07 -0.10 -0.04 0.12 -0.23 0.41 1.00 -0.02
Code 0.10 0.01 0.27 -0.09 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.09 -0.04 -0.12 1.00
Notes:
Correlations
TABLE 3
The table presents pairwise Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal for the 170 Canadian firms used in the choice analysis that were previously 
using Canadian GAAP and listed in the U.S.  Bold indicates correlations statistically significant at the 10 percent level or lower. IFRS  is equal to 1 if a firm adopts 
IFRS, and 0 if a firm adopts U.S. GAAP. CAN-US GAAP Distance is the percentage difference between the stockholders' equity under Canadian GAAP and U.S. 
GAAP calculated as Canadian GAAP stockholders' equity less U.S. GAAP stockholders' equity scaled by the absolute value of Canadian GAAP stockholders' 
equity. R&D is equal to 1 if R&D Expense is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. Exploration is equal to 1 if exploration expense is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise.  
IFRS Predominant is equal to 1 if IFRS is the most commonly used accounting standard among the 20 largest global firms (based on market value) in a given two-
digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise.  IFRS vs. US Operations indicates whether more of a firms' assets are located in IFRS countries or the U.S. and is calculated as 
assets in IFRS countries less assets in the U.S. scaled by total assets. US Ownership  is the percentage of common stock held by U.S. institutional investors. 
Leverage  is debt divided by total assets. Size  is the log of total assets. ROA  is net income divided by total assets. Code  is equal to 1 if the firm is domiciled in 
Quebec, and 0 otherwise.
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Variable Expectation Coefficient z-statistic
Intercept -0.66 -0.98      
CAN-US GAAP Distance + 0.42 1.59*    1.1%
R&D + 0.12 0.23      0.7%
Exploration + 0.67 1.34*    3.2%
IFRS Predominant + 1.18 2.38*** 16.7%
IFRS vs. US Operations + 1.04 2.90*** 4.1%
US Ownership - -1.80 -1.49*    -2.4%
Leverage +/- -0.37 -0.78      -0.5%
Size +/- 0.23 2.88*** 6.3%
ROA +/- -0.14 -0.53      -0.2%
Code + 5.47 11.42*** 5.5%
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
No. of Observations 170
McFadden R
2
37.3%
Wald χ
2
430.02
Notes:
The sample consists of 170 Canadian firms used in the choice analysis that were previously 
using Canadian GAAP and listed in the U.S. The dependent variable is IFRS , which is equal to 
1 if a firm adopts IFRS, and 0 if a firm adopts U.S. GAAP. CAN-US GAAP Distance  is the 
percentage difference between the stockholders' equity under Canadian GAAP and U.S. 
GAAP calculated as Canadian GAAP stockholders' equity less U.S. GAAP stockholders' 
equity scaled by the absolute value of Canadian GAAP stockholders' equity. R&D  is equal to 1 
if R&D Expense is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. Exploration is equal to 1 if exploration 
expense is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. IFRS Predominant  is equal to 1 if IFRS is the 
most commonly used accounting standard among the 20 largest global firms (based on market 
value) in a given two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise. IFRS vs. US Operations  indicates 
whether more of a firms' assets are located in IFRS countries or the U.S. and is calculated as 
assets in IFRS countries less assets in the U.S. scaled by total assets. US Ownership  is the 
percentage of common stock held by U.S. institutional investors. Leverage  is debt divided by 
total assets. Size  is the log of total assets. ROA  is net income divided by total assets. Code  is 
equal to 1 if the firm is domiciled in Quebec, and 0 otherwise. We calculate the marginal effect 
of each independent variable as π(x)  = Φ(x' β) using the values 0 and 1 for indicator variables 
and the first and third quartiles for continuous X  variables, with the remaining X  variables set 
equal to their mean values.  We then compute the difference in π(x)  at these two values of each 
X  variable. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-
tailed when predicted direction), respectively, based on robust standard errors. 
Marginal Effect
TABLE 4
Probit regression analysis of standard choice
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TABLE 5
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
X -0.44 -0.16 0.32*** -0.02***
X t-1 -0.50 -0.17 0.41*** -0.01***
ACC -0.09 -0.03 -0.09      -0.06      
|ACC| 0.12 0.06 0.12      0.07      
EARN -0.21 -0.07 -0.07*** -0.02***
RET 0.00 -0.06 0.24**   0.04*    
NEG 0.48 0.00 0.53      1.00      
ΔRev - ΔRec -0.01 0.00 0.01      0.00      
PPE 0.71 0.69 0.71      0.79      
BTM 0.75 0.54 0.71      0.54      
CF -0.08 0.01 -0.03      0.02**  
1/Assets 0.02 0.00 0.13      0.00      
Mills 0.51 0.51 0.32*** 0.29***
Notes:
The sample consists of the 141 U.S.-listed Canadian firms that were previously using Canadian GAAP 
with the necessary data to calculate the earnings attributes. X is annual split-adjusted earnings per share 
(measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by the weighted average number of 
outstanding shares). ACC  is net income less cash flows from operations scaled by average total assets.  
|ACC | is the absolute value of ACC . EARN  is income before extraordinary items scaled by the market 
value of equity at the beginning of the year. RET  is the 12-month return ending three months after the 
fiscal year end. NEG  is equal to 1 if RET  is negative, and 0 otherwise. ΔRev - ΔRec is the change in 
revenue less the change in receivables scaled by average total assets. PPE is gross property, plant, and 
equipment scaled by average total assets. BTM is the book value of equity scaled by the market value 
of equity. CF  is the cash flows from operations scaled by average total assets. 1/Assets is equal to 1 
scaled by average total assets. Mills is the inverse Mills' ratio calculated from the probit regression firms' 
standard choice in Table 4. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and , 0.01 levels 
(one-tailed when predicted direction), respectively, based on t-test for the difference in means and a 
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the difference in medians.
Descriptive statistics for firms used in analysis of earnings quality
U.S. GAAP (N=19) IFRS (N=122)
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Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept -0.70 -1.83*    
X t-1 + 0.69 11.82***
Post ? -0.33 -1.11      
Post*X t-1 ? -0.39 -1.43      
IFRS ? 0.39 7.97***
IFRS*Post ? 0.12 0.35      
IFRS*X t-1 ? 0.03 2.46**  
IFRS*Post*X t-1 ? 0.38 1.39      
Mills ? 1.37 1.88*    
Number of firm-year observations 488
Number of firms that adopt IFRS 122
Number of firms that adopt U.S. GAAP 19
R
2
55.3%
Notes:
TABLE 6
The impact of IFRS vs. U.S. GAAP adoption on earnings persistence
The table presents an analysis of how IFRS versus U.S. GAAP adoption affects the 
persistence of earnings for the 141 U.S.-listed Canadian firms that were previously using 
Canadian GAAP with the necessary data to calculate the earnings attributes. Of these 
141 firms, 122 firms chose IFRS and 19 firms chose U.S. GAAP. The dependent 
variable X  is annual split-adjusted earnings per share (measured as net income before 
extraordinary items divided by the weighted average number of outstanding shares). 
Post  is equal to 1 after the adoption either IFRS or U.S. GAAP, and 0 otherwise. 
IFRS  is equal to 1 if a firm adopts IFRS, and 0 otherwise (i.e., a firm adopts U.S. 
GAAP). Mills is the inverse Mills' ratio calculated from the probit regression firms' 
standard choice in Table 4. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels (one-tailed when predicted direction), respectively, based on standard 
errors clustered by firm and industry. 
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Variable
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept -0.08 -1.67**  0.13 2.12**  
IFRS ? 0.03 1.95*    -0.03 -2.84**  
Post ? -0.03 -0.58      0.00 0.01      
IFRS*Post ? -0.01 -0.13      0.03 0.51      
ΔRev - ΔRec + -0.05 -0.66      0.11 1.51*    
PPE - -0.03 -1.89**  0.02 1.14      
BTM + 0.00 -0.24      0.00 0.05      
CF - -0.07 -2.23**  -0.09 -1.55*    
1/Assets ? -0.04 -7.39*** 0.04 3.83***
Mills ? 0.04 0.39      -0.06 -0.58      
Number of firm-year observations 488 488
Number of firms that adopt IFRS 122 122
Number of firms that adopt U.S. GAAP 19 19
R
2
5.4% 7.8%
Notes:
TABLE 7
The impact of IFRS vs. U.S. GAAP adoption on accruals
ACC |ACC|
The tables present an analysis of how IFRS versus U.S. GAAP adoption affects accruals for the 
141 U.S.-listed Canadian firms that were previously using Canadian GAAP with the necessary 
data to calculate the earnings attributes. Of these 141 firms, 122 firms chose IFRS and 19 firms 
chose U.S. GAAP. The dependent variable ACC  is net income less cash flows from operations 
scaled by average total assets. |ACC|  is the absolute value of ACC . IFRS is equal to 1 if a firm 
adopts IFRS, and 0 otherwise (i.e., a firm adopts U.S. GAAP). Post  is equal to 1 after the 
adoption either IFRS or U.S. GAAP, and 0 otherwise. ΔRev - ΔRec  is the change in revenue 
less the change in receivables scaled by average total assets. PPE  is gross property, plant, and 
equipment scaled by average total assets. BTM  is the book value of equity scaled by the market 
value of equity. CF  is the cash flows from operations scaled by average total assets. 1/Assets  is 
equal to 1 scaled by average total assets. Mills is the inverse Mills' ratio calculated from the 
probit regression firms' standard choice in Table 4. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed when predicted direction), respectively, based on 
standard errors clustered by firm and industry. 
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Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept -0.21 -1.06      
RET ? -0.08 -2.83***
NEG ? 0.08 6.28***
RET*NEG + 0.41 1.41*    
Post ? 0.02 0.20      
Post*RET ? 0.61 4.16      
Post*NEG ? -0.13 -1.65      
Post*RET*NEG ? -0.73 -1.12      
IFRS ? 0.14 1.06      
IFRS*RET ? 0.24 3.27***
IFRS*NEG ? -0.08 -6.11***
IFRS*RET*NEG ? -0.25 -1.82*    
IFRS*Post ? 0.07 0.81      
IFRS*Post*RET ? -0.28 -1.63      
IFRS*Post*NEG ? 0.10 1.17      
IFRS*Post*RET*NEG ? 0.33 1.39      
Mills ? 0.12 0.35      
Number of firm-year observations 488
Number of firms that adopt IFRS 122
Number of firms that adopt U.S. GAAP 19
R
2
17.8%
Notes:
TABLE 8
The impact of IFRS vs. U.S. GAAP adoption on timeliness of loss recognition
The table presents an analysis of how IFRS versus U.S. GAAP adoption affects the 
timeliness of loss recognition for the 141 U.S.-listed Canadian firms that were previously 
using Canadian GAAP with the necessary data to calculate the earnings attributes. Of 
these 141 firms, 122 firms chose IFRS and 19 firms chose U.S. GAAP. The dependent 
variable EARN  is income before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of 
equity at the beginning of the year. RET  is the 12-month return ending three months after 
the fiscal year end. NEG is equal to 1 if RET  is negative, and 0 otherwise. Post  is 
equal to 1 after the adoption either IFRS or U.S. GAAP, and 0 otherwise. IFRS  is 
equal to 1 if a firm adopts IFRS, and 0 otherwise (i.e., a firm adopts U.S. GAAP). 
Mills is the inverse Mills' ratio calculated from the probit regression firms' standard 
choice in Table 4. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels (one-tailed when predicted direction), respectively, based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and industry. 
